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OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KUTV INC., Deseret News Publishing
Company, KSL AM and TV, a Division of
Bonneville International Corporation,
and Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Utah Chapter,
Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, District
Judge, and RONALD DALE EASTHOPE,
Respondents.
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Case No. 18231

MEMORANDUM OF PETITIONERS
KUTV INC. AND DESERET NEWS
PUBLISHING COMPANY

Petitioners KUTV Inc. and Deseret News Publishing Company respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of petitioners' Complaint and Petition for Extraordinary Writ filed
herein on February 4, 1982.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an original proceeding on KUTV Inc. 's and
Deseret News Publishing Company's complaint and petition for an
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extraordinary writ directing the Third Judicial District Court
for Salt Lake County to vacate an order prohibiting the Utah
news media from using the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" and/or
referring to respondent Ronald Dale Easthope's past criminal
convictions, and for a determination that the District Court's
order is beyond its authority and contrary to law.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT
Petitioners seek an order vacating the Third District
Court's order prohibiting the Utah news media from using the
term "Sugarhouse Rapist" or from referring to respondent Ronald
Dale Easthope's past criminal convictions; Petitioners also
seek a judgment that the Third District Court's order is or was
a violation of Petitioners' constitutional rights.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 3, 1982, the first day of respondent
Ronald Dale Easthope's criminal trial for aggravated sexual
assault, respondent Honorable Dean E. Conder (hereinafter the
"District Court") observed an employee of KUTV Inc. in the
courtroom.

The District Court requested that the KUTV employee

meet in chambers with the Judge, the Prosecutor, the Defendant
and counsel for the Defendant.
ent at this meeting.

Counsel for KUTV was not pres-

Outside the presence of the jury, but on

the record, the District Court issued an order prohibiting the
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Utah news media from broadcasting, publishing or otherwise conveying to the public during the pendency of the trial the term
"Sugarhouse Rapist" or any information relating to the past
criminal convictions of Ronald Dale Easthope.
In 1971, Respondent Ronald Dale Easthope (hereinafter
the "Defendant") had been charged by police with ten rapes and
was convicted on two counts of rape, one count of sodomy, and
one count of aggravated robbery.

The term "Sugarhouse Rapist"

was used by the news media during the Defendant's previous
trial and subsequent convictions because most of the Defendant's victims lived and were assaulted in the Sugarhouse area
of Salt Lake City.
Upon being informed of the District Court's order,
counsel for KUTV Inc. (hereinafter ''KUTV") requested and was
granted permission to meet later in the afternoon of February 3, 1982 with the District Court, the Prosecutor, the
Defendant and counsel for the Defendant.

In chambers and off

the record, the District Court explained that its order was
motivated by its concern that the Defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial would be jeopardized if the news media
published information concerning the Defendant's past criminal
convictions or used the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" in referring
-to the Defendant.

Counsel for KUTV pointed out that the

Defendant's criminal convictions and the sobriquet "Sugarhouse
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Rapist" were matters of public record,

1

and argued that the

District Court's order constituted an impermissible prior
restraint.

Counsel for KUTV also suggested that the District

Court could ~dequately protect the Defendant's right to a fair
trial by imposing other less extreme restrictions, such as
sequestering the jury or instructing the jury not to avail
itself of the media during the trial.

The District Court,

after indicating that it had already admonished the jury not to
read the newspapers, listen to radio news, or watch the news on
television, denied KUTV's request that the order be vacated.
KUTV's six o'clock and ten o'clock news programs for February

3, 1982 were rewritten to comply with the District Court's
order.
On February 8, 1982 after a trial in which the Defendant testified that he had previously been convicted and that he
had been enrolled in a rehabilitation program for sex offenders, the Defendant was found guilty of the crime of aggravated
sexual assault.

1

For example, the Deseret News published reports referring
to the Defendant's past criminal convictions and/or using the
term "Sugarhouse Rapist" on October 14, 1981; September 24,
1981; September 23, 1981; July 7, 1977; January 23, 1974;
August 23, 1973; June 1, 1973; October 21, 1971; July 9, 1971;
June 23, 1971; March 4, 1971; and February 27, 1971.
Similarly, KUTV broadcast news programs referring to the Defendant
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist" on September 24, 1981; June 15,
1979; and Juli 7, 1977.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court's order prohibiting the Utah news
media from referring to the Defendant as the "Sugarhouse
Rapist" or mentioning the Defendant's prior convictions expired
of its own terms upon the conclusion of the Defendant's trial.
Although the District Court's order expired prior to its consideration by this Court, Petitioners' case is not moot because
it falls into that category of disputes "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" which the United States Supreme Court has
ruled exempt from the mootness doctrine.
Absent extraordinary circumstances not present in this
case, the District Court may not impose prior restraints upon
the media's publication of information concerning the defendant
in a criminal case which are matters of public record.

Such

prior restraints violate the media's First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and are contrary to a recognized public policy
favoring public criminal trials.
I.

THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE ARE
NOT MOOT EVEN THOUGH THE DISTRICT
COURT'S ORDER HAS EXPIRED
By its terms the District Court's order prohibiting
the reporting of Defendant's prior criminal convictions or the
use of the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" (hereinafter the "Order")
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expired upon the conclusion of the Defendant's trial in the
District Court.

The Defendant was convicted five days after

the District Court issued its Order and four days after the
Petitioners filed their Complaint and Petition with this
Court.

Despite the fact that the Order has expired, this case

is not moot.
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, "jurisdiction is not
necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has
expired, if the underlying dispute between the parties is one
'capable of repetition, yet evading review'."
546 (1976).

427 U.S. 539,

See also, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.

Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980); Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979).
In the Nebraska Press case, representatives of the
news media challenged a trial court's order restraining the
publication or broadcasting of certain confessions and admissions made by the defendant prior to his trial for the murders
of six family members.

Although the trial court's order had

expired long before the case was considered by the Supreme
Court, the Court found that the controversy in that case was
"capable of repetition" in two ways.

First, if the defendant's

conviction were reversed and a new trial ordered, the trial
court might again impose a restrictive order.

Second,· if the
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lower court's decision upholding the restrictive order were
allowed to stand, similar orders might be sought in other criminal cases.

"[I]f we decline to address the issues in this

case on grounds of mootness," stated the Supreme Court, "the
dispute will evade review in this Court since these orders are
by nature short-lived."

Nebraska Press Association v.

Stuart, 427 U.S. at 547; see also, Gannett Co., Inc. v.
DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. at 2904.

These rationales articulated by

the United States Supreme Court apply with equal force to the
instant case.

Consequently, this Court should conclude that

this case is not moot and that it should be decided on its
merits.
II.

THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION DICTATE THAT
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER BE
HELD INVALID AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE
PRIOR RESTRAINT
As recently recognized by this Court, "[f]reedom of
the press and the right to a fair trial are among our most
cherished values.

Any tension between these values is there-

fore difficult to resolve."

In re Modification of Canon

3A(7), 628 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1981).

Petitioners submit,

however, that in this case any "tension" or conflict between
the two constitutional values can be readily alleviated by
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remedies considerably less drastic than the judicial censorship
of public information prescribed by the District Court.

This

Court should condemn the District Court's "gag order" as an
impermissible prior restraint which negates the Petitioners'
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, a trial
court, in an attempt to prevent the jurors in a murder trial
from acquiring potentially inaccurate information about the
case from the news media, excluded the public and media representatives from the courtroom.

The publishers of a local

newspaper contested the closure order, and the United States
Supreme Court held that "the right to attend criminal trials is
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment . .
Absent an overriding interest articulated in the findings~ the
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public."
Ct. 2814, 2829-30 (1980).

100 S.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court

pointed out that unlike a pretrial proceeding, "there exist in
the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to
satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness."

2830.

Id. at

Sequestration of the jurors and exclusion of disruptive

witnesses from the courtroom were both recognized by the
Supreme Court as acceptable alternatives to closure of the
trial.

"All of the alternatives admittedly present difficul-
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ties for trial courts," stated the Court, "but none of the factors relied on here was beyond the realm of the manageable."

Id.
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, as
in the Richmond Newspapers case, the trial court's attempt at
prior restraint arose in the context of a trial setting, rather
than a pretrial proceeding.

Once a jury has been impaneled,

remedies such as jury sequestration may reasonably be expected
to obviate any threat that adverse publicity might pose to a
defendant's right to a fair trial.
In the instant case, the District Court's Order did
not prevent the Petitioners from attending the Defendant's
trial, but rather it suppressed the dissemination of information about the Defendant's prior criminal convictions,
despite the fact that portions of the Defendant's own testimony
during the trial alluded to his prior convictions for sexual
offenses.

The United States Supreme Court has emphasized, how-

ever, that a trial court's order prohibiting the "reporting of
evidence adduced at [an] open preliminary hearing . . . plainly
violated settled principles:

'[T]here is nothing that pro-

scribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the
courtroom'."

Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S.

at 568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63
(1966)).
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Similarly, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975), the Supreme Court considered a case in which
the father of a deceased rape victim sought to recover damages
for invasion of privacy from a broadcasting company which, in
violation of Georgia law, televised the identity of the victim
during its coverage of the rapist's trial.

After noting that

the victim's identity was a matter of public court record, the
Court ruled that "[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot
be sanctioned for publishing it."

Id. at 496.

In Nebraska Press and Cox the United States Supreme
Court decreed that a trial

co~rt

may not restrict the publica-

tion of pretrial courtroom evidence or public court records.
Consequently, it is difficult to imagine on what grounds the
District Court can justify its prohibition against the publication of information gleaned not only from the court's public
records but also from files maintained by the news media themselves.

This is especially true since both this Court and the

Supreme Court of the United States have ruled that adverse publicity alone does not necessarily prevent a defendant in a
criminal case from obtaining a fair trial.
It has often been acknowledged that in extreme circumstances, adverse publicity can deprive a defendant in a criminal case of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.

See,
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Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v.

Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977); Sinclair
v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P.2d 305 (1967).

As the United

States Supreme Court admonished in Murphy v. Florida, however,
these cases "cannot be made to stand for the proposition that
juror exposure to information about a state defendant's prior
convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is
charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process."

421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975).

See also, Nebraska Press

Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 565

(even "pervasive and

concentrated" pretrial publicity does not automatically lead to
unfair trial); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1349 ("news
prominance alone [does not] presumptively deprive one of due
process in a trial setting").
It would appear, then, that absent extremely prejudicial circumstances, a defendant in a criminal trial is not
entitled to insist that he be tried by jurors who have been
unexposed to pervasive, adverse publicity.

Consequently, it

would be odd indeed if a trial court could, in the absence of
such extraordinary circumstances, sharply curtail the freedom
of the press for the purpose of sheltering.a defendant from a
degree of public comment which the United States Supreme Court
has found constitutionally unobjectionable.

-11-
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The United States Supreme Court has stressed that
"prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights .

. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or

civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior
restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time."
Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 559.

Nebraska Press

The Court in Nebraska

Press also stressed that the "authors of the Bill of Rights
did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights . . . . Yet is it nonetheless
clear that the barriers to prior restraint remain high unless
we are to abandon what the Court has said for nearly a quarter
of our national existence and implied throughout all of it."
Id. at 561.
It is noteworthy that in a case strikingly similar to
this one, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down a trial
court's order enjoining the news media from referring to the
accused as the "Quapaw Quarter rapist" in any story published
prior to trial.

In ruling that the trial court's order could

not pass constitutional scrutiny, the Arkansas supreme court
echoed the United States Supreme Court when it stated that
"[a]ny prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity, and the government carries a heavy
burden of demonstrating justification for its imposition."
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Arkansas Gazette v. Lofton, 598 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Ark. 1980).
Petitioners urge this Court, therefore, to conclude that if
considerations of prejudicial pretrial publicity were insufficient to justify restrictions against using the term "Quapaw
Quarter rapist" in Arkansas, a Utah trial court which has
already impaneled a jury cannot rationally defend its prohibition against the media's use of the term "Sugarhouse Rapist."
Moreover, if the Supreme Court's characterization of
the "barriers to prior restraint" is to have any meaning at
all, it must describe some obstacle more substantial than that
shown by the facts in this case.

Although the District Court

surely acted in good faith, Petitioners contend that the District Court's imposition of prior restraint was unjustified by
the circumstances and is constitutionally deficient.

The

District Court made no findings that other measures short of
prior restraint -- such as sequestration of the jury -- would
prove inadequate to protect the Defendant's right to a fair
trial.

Indeed, the District Court did not even enter a finding

that unsequestered jurors who would be exposed to publication
of information about the Defendant's past criminal convictions
or to references to the "Sugarhouse Rapist" would be improperly
prejudiced against the Defendant.

Before a trial court may so

drastically limit the freedom of the press, it must find, on
the basis of adequate evidence, that the defendant's Sixth

-13-
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Amendment rights can be protected in no other way.

No such

showing was made here, and as a result, the District Court's
Order cannot pass constitutional muster.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's Order, like those considered by
the Supreme Court in the Nebraska Press, Gannett and Richmond
Newspapers cases, was "by nature short-lived."

Because con-

troversies concerning such gag orders are "capable of repetition, yet evading review," this Court should not find Petitioners' case moot, but should decide it on the merits.
There was no showing in this case that media reports
of the Defendant's prior criminal record had been or were
likely to be in any way inaccurate or unduly inflammatory.
Furthermore, a jury had already been impaneled at the time the
District Court issued its Order, and the Defendant's right to a
fair trial could have been adequately protected by the simple
means of insulating the jury from any publicity appearing in
the media during the trial.

Petitioners ask this Court,

therefore, to rule that unfounded speculation about the adverse
effects of future news reports offered the District Court an
inadequate foothold for surmounting the formidable constitutional barriers to prior restraint.

The Order of the District

Court should be vacated and a determination made that the Order

-14-
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violated Petitioner's rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.

Respectfully submitted this 11th day of February, 1982.

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
r2

~
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF PETITIONERS KUTV INC. AND DESERET NEW PUBLISHING COMPANY
was mailed, postage prepaid this 11th day of February, 1982.
Honorable Dean E. Conder
District Judge
Third Judicial District Court
Metropolitan Hall of Justice
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Thomas P.
SALT LAKE
431 South
Salt Lake

Vuyk, Esq.
COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
Third East
City, Utah 84111

Mark Van Wagoner, Esq.
CALLISTER, GREENE & NEBEKER
800 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Lynn R. Brown, Esq.
LEGAL DEFENDERS OFFICE
333 South Second East #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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